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This action was brought by the Plaintiff/Appellant
to establish that the proper procedure to obtain judicial
review of action taken by the Salt Lake County Board of
County Commissioners in license revocation matters is
by way of appeal to district court and trial de novo thereon;
and to challenge the constitutionality and validity of the
Salt Lake County massage parlor ordinance, Sections 15-18-6,
10 and 1 1 / Salt Lake County Ordinances.
-'"The above action was initiated after the Plaintiff/
Appellant was accused of violations of the above mentioned
county ordinances and hearing held before the Salt Lake
County Commission;.-after which the Board of Salt Lake County
Commissioners voted to revoke the business license of the
Plaintiff/Appellantf
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_, f ,. The matter was first brought before the Third
District Court, Honorable Bryant

f-_

H. Croft, Judge, In-••+ :c

Case No. 229028, In which case the Judge ruled the BoarduoO
of County Commissioners action was acting in excess of its
jurisdiction when the Board of County Commissioners, which
at time of hearing, consisted of only Commissioner Kutulas
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and Commissioner McClure, who voted one for revocation
and one against, and then let Commissioner Dunn, who had
been absent from the hearing, vote for revocation after
he returned and read minutes of the hearing.
The second matter was brought as Case No. 230771
after the Defendant Board of County Commissioners had a
rehearing on the matter of revocation of the Plaintiff/
Appellant's business license and voted unanimously to
revoke said license which action resulted in the Court
grantint the Defendant/Respondents motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff/Appellant's action which judgment is hereby
appealed from.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks reversal of the lower
Court's dismissal of her complaint in Case No. 230771;
declaration of her right to appeal action of the Board of
County Commissioners to District Court with right to a
trial de novo thereon; and remand to Third District Court
of the question of the constitutionality of Salt Lake
County Ordinance Sections 15-18-6,10 and 11.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
That shortly before November 9, 197^, the Salt
Lake County Board of County Commissioners passed an
2
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improper and null and void as not conforming to procedure
outlined In the Defendant/Respondents own ordinances:
3
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in her Second Cause of-Action, that the evidence adduced
before the Board of County Commissioners did not support
the findings and that the matters were set forth by way
of appeal to the Third District Court from the Board of
County Commissioners (hereinafter called Board) action;
and in her Third Cause of Action, alleged the unconstitutionality and invalidity of the Defendant/Respondents'
ordinance and her right to declaratory relief therefrom.
The Defendants/Respondents moved to dissolve
the Plaintiff/AppellantTs Temporary Restraining Order
and also moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint.
The Plaintiff/Appellant filed her memorandum of law in
support of her right to an appeal to District Court and
trial de novo thereon from the Board's action.
After hearing argument in support of the
Plaintiff's and the Defendants' positions the Court
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to the
Plaintiff's Second and Third Cause of Action, but denied
the motion as to the First Cause of Action and found the
Board's actions to be illegal and null and void.

The

Plaintiff filed notice of appeal to the Supreme Court
on the dismissal of Cause of Actions No. 2 and No. 3On or about September 22, 1975, another hearing
was held before the Defendant Board on the license
revocation matter, the Board hearing testimony from two
4
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witnesses and the Plaintiff/Appellant. -The Board voted
to revoke the license of the Plaintiff and issued its order
so doing.
The Plaintiff then filed her complaint as Case
No. 230771* alleging again her right to an appeal to
District Court and trial de novo on the license revocation
matter; her need for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to protect her from economic
damage during the pendency of the proceedings; and the
unconstitutionality and impropriety of the Defendants'
Board's Ordinance.

The Plaintiff obtained a temporary

restraining order.
After Plaintiff and Defendant filed memorandua
of law the Court again heard argument and granted the
Defendant Board's motion to dismiss as to all three of
the Plaintiff's Causes of Action.
The Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal and
motion for preliminary injunction which the Court granted,
enjoining the Defendants Board and the Salt Lake County
Sheriff from arresting the Plaintiff or any of her
employees for doing business without a license during
the pendency of these proceedings.
In December of 1975* Plaintiff tendered payment
to the Salt Lake County License Department but was refused

5
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issuance of a business license for 1976.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY SET OUT BY
STATUTE, PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT TO APPEAL TO
THE DISTRICT COURT FROM A DECISION REVOKING
HER BUSINESS LICENSE BY THE DEFENDANT BOARD
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AND TRIAL DE NOVO
THEREON.

Jurisdiction over this type of matter is conferred
upon the District Court by Article VIII,§7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, which states:
The District Court shall have
original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal not
excepted in this Constitution,
and not prohibited by law:
appellate jurisdiction from all
courts and tribunals, and a
supervisory control of the same...
(emphasis added)
Section 78-3-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is
a near ver batim codification of the language of Article
VIII §7 of the Constitution.
Rule 81(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, recites:
"These rules shall apply to the
practice and procedure in appealing
from or obtaining a review of any
order, ruling or other action of
an administrative board of agency,
insofar as the specific statutory
•• procedure in connection with any
such appeal or review is in conflict
or inconsistent with these rules.
Which language therefore makes the provisions
of Rule 57, on declaratory judgments, and Rule 73 on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

appellate procedure applicable to review- of or appeal from
orders or rulings of the Defendant Board of County
Commissioners.
Further authority is granted by §§78-33-1 through
13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953* to Districts Courts within
their respective jurisdictions, to declare rights, status,
and other legal relations between parties, or under statutes
and ordinances (78-33-2 and 78-33-5) and in addition,
states that any enumeration of power does not limit or
restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in
Section 78-33-1 (78-33-5) and further, states that the
chapter is to be liberally construed (78-33-12).
There appears to be no statutory language that
specifies how an appeal is to be taken from an order of
a Board of County Commissioners.

This situation however

is analagous to an appeal from a decision of one of the
Boards of the Department of Business Regulations in which
a license issued by a branch of the Department of
Registration is revoked or suspended by that Board's action.
A case in point is Baker v. Department of Registration et al.
78 Utah 424, 3 P.2d 1082, which involved revocation by the
Department of Registration of a physician's license to
practice.

The then existing statute which authorized

hearings in proceedings to revoke licenses contained therein

7
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the statement: "•.•provided that appeal to'the Courts may
be had..." (Laws 1921c 130 Section 3 sub. f as amended
laws 1923 c.49 Section 1) Counsel for Appellant and
Respondent in that case both agreed that because the
legislature did not provide specifically how an appeal
should be taken, that therefore an appeal could not be
taken.

The Supreme Court disagreed!

The Court said at

page 1086, 3 P.2d. :
"...that Courts may not usurp the
functions of lawmaking powers by
giving a meaning to its enactments
where no meaning exists, or by substituting conjectural interpretation
for judicial exposition, may readily
be conceded as applied to substantive
law, but courts not infrequently are
required to, and do, adopt rules of
procedure in furtherance of the exercise
of both original and appellate jurisdictions, especially where such
jurisdiction is conferred by constitutional provisions. If either original
or appellate jurisdiction is by
constitutional provisions conferred
upon a court, the failure of the
legislature to provide the manner in
which such jurisdiction shall be
exercised cannot defeat the jurisdiction
so conferred." (emphasis added)
The Court then quotes at length from the California case of
People v. Jordan, 65 Cal 644, 4 P.683, 684, in which there
were no provisions at all for an appeal from a criminal
action of the type in which the Defendant was involved.
The California Supreme Court created the procedure for an
appeal saying,
8
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"But thfe authority of any -usage is
derived from its recognition and sanction
by the Court, and we cannot decline to
take cognizance of a matter clearly within
our jurisdiction because the mode of
procedure applicable to it has not been
regulated by statute, written rule or
precedent. In such a case it is our
duty to create a precedent. .. tthe power
of courts to establish a system of
procedure by means of which parties may
seek the exercise of their jurisdiction,
at least when a system has not been
established by legislative authority is
inherent." (emphasis added)
The Utah Court cites the provision of Article VIII §7
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, noting that the
district court is given appellate jurisdiction of all
inferior Courts and tribunals (emphasis added).

The

Court there says at page 1088 Pacific Reporter:
"...the right to practice medicine is
a valuable property right, and the
proceeding to revoke such right is
essentially the exercise of a judicial
function. While the Department of
Registration is primarily an
administrative body, it exercises
judicial functions when it undertakes to hear and determine whether
or not a license of a physician and
surgeon shall be revoked. It is,
while exercising such functions,
essentially a tribunalT7* (emphasis added)
It is submitted that the matter at bar is esentially
the same as the situation in the foregoing case: The Salt
Lake County Board of County Commissioners, while sitting
in judgment on a question of license revocation under
ordinances passed by itself, is sitting as as tribunal.
A more compelling reason for the propriety of an appeal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the district court from a County Boardf-s decision is
that the County is sitting as a tribunal in judgment of
alleged violations of an ordinance enacted by itself
and has in the enactment of the County Ordinances failed
to provide for any appeal from its decisions.
It should here be noted that the District Court,
in the instant case, has said that in its view, the
way to proceed is by way of Rule 65B(b)(2) or (b)(4)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, Rule 65B(e) says

in its last sentence "the review by the Court issuing
the writ shall not be extended further than to determine
whether the inferior tribunal, board or officer has

r

regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board
or officer."

If this is to be done, here we have a

situation in which the Board of County Commissioners
enacts ordinances enpowering themselves to do certain
acts and granting themselves certain jurisdiction and if
review under Rule 65B is all that is to be allowed,
then all the reviewing Court can do is to determine whether
they have adhered to the authority they have granted themselves.

The actions of the Board of County Commissioners

then became a closed system, responsible primarily only to
itself, having decided to assume judicial functions, and
take penal actions and all without having to adhere to
rules of evidence or civil procedure, thereby denying those
10
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who come before it of due process of law-.
The Constitution of the State of Utah in Article VIII
§7 provided that the District Courts have appellate
jurisdiction over inferior courts and tribunals. The
Court in Baker, Supra, page 1089, 3 P.2d., says that the
district courts are courts of general jurisdiction and that
the Department of Registration is a tribunal of limited
jurisdiction and therefore a tribunal inferior to the
district court.

It is submitted that when a Board of

County Commissioners sits as a tribunal it is likewise
a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and therefore inferior
to the district Court and the district Court has appellate
jurisdiction thereover.

POINT II. UPON TAKING APPEAL TO DISTRICT
COURT THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL
DE NOVO.

The above cited case, Baker v. Department of
Registration, Supra., and a case of the same nature decided
a few years later, Moormeister v. Golding, 84 Utah 324,
establish that appeals may be taken from decisions of
inferior tribunals to district courts and liken such .
appeals to appeals taken from Justice Courts to District
Courts.

Moormeister (supra) extends the Baker statement

of the appeal and further likens such an appeal to one
from a Justice Court to a District Court by saying that
11
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the effect of the appeal is to grant the appellant a
trial de novo in District Court (page 3^2, 84 Utah Reports)
and that "the general rule is, unless otherwise provided
by statute, that an appeal, where the case is triable
de novo, vacates the judgment appealed from."

POINT III. THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE
HEARD THE QUESTION OP THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' ORDINANCE.

The Plaintiff/Appellant was in the position of
having the penal sanctions of the revised ordinance
enforced against her, so the question of the constitutionality and propriety of the ordinance was ripe for
adjudication.

A controversy existed as soon as the Defendant

Board gave the Plaintiff notice that she would be required
to show cause why her business license should not be
revoked.

As the Court has said in Clayton v. Bennett,

5 Utah 2d. 152, 15^ 298 P.2d 531:
"We are not in disagreement with
the first three propositions Plaintiff
asserts: (1) That the Defendant
Department of Business Regulation,
as an administrative agency, does not
determine the constitutionality of
statutes, (2) that declaratory
judgment coupled with injunctive
procedure is a correct method of
challenging the constitutionality
of the statutes upon which Defendant
relies for its authority, (3) that
the right to engage in a profession
is a property right which is entitled
to protection by the law and the
Courts." (emphasis added).
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Irrespective of whether the District Court
agreed or disagreed with the Plaintifffs request for an
appealj the constitutionality of the Defendant's ordinance
was challenged properly and therefore ripe for adjudication,
and s-hould have been placed in issue and decided.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff's Complaint clearly stated a cause
of action on the constitutional issue and under the
doctrine of Clayton v. Bennett (Supra), the issue should
have been heard.
As has previously been argued, an aggrieved party
must have the right to appeal a decision of a Board of
County Commissioners sitting as a tribunal in order that
he be allowed due process.

This right of appeal includes

the right to a bona fide adversary proceeding in a trial
de novo to assure protection of the aggrieved party's
constitutional rights.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
g^day of March, 1976.

'Q^LJJL&A^
b< KENDALL PERKINS ^
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 359-7756
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